In this paper we introduce a new class of OR games: economic lot-sizing (ELS) games.
Introduction
In this paper we consider a new type of inventory/production game. The model underlying the cooperative game is the classical Wagner-Whitin or the (somewhat more general) economic lotsizing (ELS) problem. Wagner and Whitin (1958) were the first who studied this OR problem and it can be described as follows. Given a known demand for a finite discrete time horizon, one has to find a production plan such that total costs are minimized. Relevant costs include setup cost, production cost and holding cost.
Consider the following ELS situation in which a number of retailers sell the same product.
They order the product at a single manufacturer, store it for some periods and sell it to the customers. Furthermore, assume that the manufacturer charges ordering and production costs for a single order. Now by cooperating the retailers may obtain a cost saving. Namely, if the retailers place one big order instead of placing individual orders total ordering costs will be smaller.
Moreover, production cost can also be reduced by merging their production plans. A prime question then becomes how to share the minimal total joint costs. To answer this question we analyze a corresponding TU-game in which the value for each coalition is determined by minimizing its total costs by joint ordering. So the players in this game are the retailers. We will call this game the ELS game related to the underlying ELS situation.
A practical situation to which the ELS game may apply is for example a corporation with several financially independent divisions that have a demand for the same item. The corporation has the policy to make joint orders for the divisions in order to minimize total joint costs. Of course the corporation is faced with the internal problem of fairly splitting these costs to the various divisions.
In this paper we will focus on the balancedness, the core and concavity of ELS games. The core of a game consists of stable cost divisions of the total joint costs in which no subset of players has a direct incentive to leave the grand coalition, because this will increase the cost for each subset of players. A cooperative game has a non-empty core if and only it is balanced (Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) ). A well-known class of balanced games are concave or submodular games.
For a concave game it holds that the marginal contribution (in terms of cost) of a single player to a coalition equals at least the marginal contribution of that player to a larger coalition. Concave games are known to have nice properties. Namely, for concave games, the core of the game is equal to the convex hull of the marginal vectors (see Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) ) and, as a result, the Shapley-value is the barycenter of the core. Furthermore, the kernel coincides with the nucleolus and the bargaining set and the core coincide (see Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972) ).
In the literature there are two recent papers that are closely related to our work: Guardiola, Meca and Puerto (2005) and Meca, Timmer, Garcia-Jurado and Borm (2004) . The paper by Guardiola et al. (2005) discusses the literature on inventory centralization games and considers a production/inventory situation where players can cooperate by sharing production facilities and warehouse facilities, i.e., items are produced, stored and backlogged by the player with, respectively, the lowest production, holding and backlogging costs. The corresponding game is called a production-inventory game. The main results derived by Guardiola et al. (2005) are that production-inventory games are totally balanced and that the Owen set reduces to a singleton.
The major difference between Guardiola et al. (2005) and the current paper is in the underlying OR problem. Our underlying model is the ELS problem, where a setup cost is incurred when an order is placed, which makes the cost structure non-linear. Guardiola et al. (2005) , on the contrary, assume linear production, holding and backlogging costs, which makes the problem easier to analyze. In fact, it is not difficult to show that in their setting the optimal production plan can be determined by considering all demand periods independently, whereas in the ELS problem the optimal ordering plan depends on the sizes of the demands of consecutive periods. Meca et al. (2004) consider a class of inventory games that arise when there is a possibility of joint ordering in an economic order quantity (EOQ) environment. The underlying OR problem is the well-known EOQ model, which was already introduced by Harris (see Harris (1913) ). In this continuous time model with infinite horizon it is assumed that a single firm faces a constant demand rate. The objective of the firm is to minimize its inventory and ordering costs. Meca et al. (2004) extend this analysis to the situation where a collection of firms tries to minimize their total ordering and inventory costs by joint ordering. They analyze a corresponding cooperative game and focus on cost division rules. Our ELS game can be seen as a discrete version of the model by Meca et al. (2004) with a finite horizon and time varying demand.
Besides the area of inventory management, the application of cooperative game theory in other OR areas has received much attention. In short an OR game consists of multiple players that not only face a joint optimization problem that arises from some OR related problem, but also face the additional problem of how to allocate the cost savings or revenues among the players. A survey of OR games can be found in Borm, Hamers and Hendrickx (2001) . Here, next to production and inventory games, OR games on connection (e.g. fixed tree and spanning tree), routing (e.g. Chinese postman and travelling salesman) and scheduling (e.g. sequencing, permutation and assignment) are discussed. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we will describe the ELS model and we recall the well-known Wagner-Whitin algorithm that solves an ELS problem instance. In section 3 we will introduce ELS games and give an example. In section 4 we will prove that ELS games are balanced. The proof is obtained by merging production plans (of balanced collections) of coalitions to production plans of the grand coalition in such a way that we can show the balancedness conditions of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) ). In section 5 we consider two special classes of ELS games that are concave: the ELS game with equal demand for each player and the 2-period ELS game.
In this section we introduce the ELS model. The ELS problem can be described as follows. For a fixed model horizon T there is a known demand for a single item per time period. This demand has to be satisfied each period by producing in this period or in previous periods, i.e., back-logging is not allowed. Relevant cost typically include production costs and holding (inventory) costs. The production costs consist of a fixed component (setup or ordering cost) and unit production cost.
The goal is to determine how much to produce in each period so as to minimize the total costs.
If for each period t = 1, . . . , T we let d t = demand in period t K t = setup or ordering cost in period t h t = holding cost in period t p t = unit production cost in period t x t = items produced in period t I t = ending inventory in period t, then the problem can be formulated as follows Wagner and Whitin (1958) propose a forward dynamic programming algorithm to find the optimal production plan. They show that there exists an optimal solution with the property
That is, production only takes place if inventory drops down to zero. This is the so-called zeroinventory (ZI) property. Because back-logging is not allowed, this implies that there exists an optimal solution for which
So a production plan is completely determined by its production periods, where a production period is defined as a period with non-zero production. 
Furthermore, let F (t) be the minimal cost of the production plan for period 1 through t and let
Wagner and Whitin show that this algorithm runs in O(T 2 ) time. After applying this recursion (called the Wagner-Whitin algorithm), the optimal production plan can be easily obtained by back-tracking. Note that this recursion formula only works for problem instances with strictly positive demand in period 1, which will be the case in this paper.
More sophisticated algorithms have been developed by Federgruen and Tzur (1991) , Wagelmans, Van Hoesel and Kolen (1992) and Aggarwal and Park (1993) . They show that a general ELS problem instance can be solved in O(T log T ) time and a problem instance without speculative motives (i.e., p t + h t ≥ p t+1 for t = 1, . . . , T − 1) can be solved in O(T ) time. For more details on the ELS problem we refer to these papers. We illustrate the ELS problem by the following example.
Example 1 Consider a 6-period ELS problem instance with parameters according to is to produce 44 items in period 1 and 23 items in period 5 (that is x 1 = 44, x 5 = 23 and
. Total costs corresponding to this production plan equal 149 (setup cost:
40 + 40 = 80 and holding cost: 1 · 11 + 2 · 12 + 3 · 6 + 1 · 16 = 69). Note that for simplicity we have taken stationary cost parameters. Of course, in the case of non-stationary cost parameters the Wagner-Whitin algorithm can also be applied.
The economic lot-sizing game
In this section we introduce ELS games. Consider a set of retailers N = {1, . . . , n} that sell the same item. They all have a known demand for a T -period model horizon. All retailers buy the items at the same manufacturer. When a retailer places an order, the manufacturer charges ordering cost and production cost, which is linear in the amount of items ordered. Furthermore, when a retailer carries inventory from one period to the next period to satisfy future demand, holding costs are incurred. We assume that in a single period holding costs are equal for each retailer. Now a single retailer tries to minimize its total ordering, production and holding costs.
Note that this is exactly the situation as in the ELS problem, where setup cost in the ELS problem corresponds to ordering cost in the ELS game.
If a collection of retailers cooperates in the above setting, a cost saving may be obtained.
Namely, instead of placing individual orders the retailers can place a joint order and save ordering cost. It is not difficult to see that it is always profitable for two (or more) retailers to cooperate.
Namely, if we have two optimal production plans we can construct a new production plan, where the amount ordered in each period is the sum of the amount ordered in the two individual plans.
That is, if x i t and x j t are the amounts ordered by retailer i and j in period t, respectively, then the amount ordered in the newly constructed production plan is x i t + x j t . This production plan has total cost equal to the sum of the individual production plans if none of the production periods coincide. If one or more production periods coincide, a gain is obtained, because less setup costs are incurred. Later on we will show that in general even higher cost savings can be obtained.
As mentioned above equal holding costs are assumed for each retailer. This assumption can be easily justified in the context of one corporation with several divisions. If we drop the assumption of equal holding cost, the underlying OR problem is not equal to the ELS problem anymore, but it becomes more complex, because we have to differentiate over the retailers when calculating the holding cost. As a result, the corresponding game becomes harder to analyze and it would be interesting to investigate whether the results derived in this paper still hold.
To describe the game mathematically, let d i be the demand vector of player (retailer) i and let d S be the demand vector of coalition S ⊂ N , i.e.,
Then the optimal production plan for coalition S can be found by applying the Wagner-Whitin Note that a vector (and not a matrix) is sufficient to specify the holding cost, because we assume equal holding cost for each player.
Definition 1 Let N, T , D, K, p, h be an ELS situation. Then the corresponding ELS game (N, c) is defined as c(S)
From the discussion above it immediately follows that ELS games are subadditive, i.e., c(S) +
c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) for all S, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = Ø. We illustrate the ELS game by the following example.
Example 2 Consider an ELS game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}. Again we have a 6 period problem with setup cost
and demand according to Table 2 : Demand matrix of example 2 yields the optimal cost for each coalition. In table 3 one can find the optimal cost for each coalition with corresponding production plans. For example, the cost of coalition S = {1, 3} is calculated (33, 27, 20, 26, 25, 18) .
Observe that cooperation of player 1 and 3 will lead to a cost saving of 149 + 134 − 191 = 92.
On the balancedness of ELS games
In this section we will provide the balancedness result for ELS games. To prove balancedness we use the following property of the ELS model. In an ELS model we may assume without loss of generality that holding costs are zero. This can be derived by
Then the ELS problem can be written as
where
Note that the last term in the objective function is constant and can be omitted. Hence, each ELS problem instance is equivalent to a similar problem instance with zero holding cost and each ELS situation Γ = N, T , D, K, p, h can be transformed into an ELS situation with holding cost zero. We call this transformed ELS situation the zero ELS situation and we denote it by
The following example shows a transformed ELS problem instance.
Example 3 Consider the problem instance of Example 1. Note that
i=t h i and h t = 0 leads to the transformed ELS problem instance of Hence, the games (N, c) and (N, c 0 ) are strategically equivalent. So to prove balancedness we can restrict to games that arise from zero ELS situations.
In the proof we will further use the following convenient notation for production plans. As noted before production plans are completely described by setting the production periods. Let X be a production plan. Then X t = 1 if period t is a production period and X t = 0 otherwise for t = 1, . . . , T . Further, let p t (X) be the unit production cost of plan X in period t, i.e., p t (X) = p i with i = max{j ≤ t|X j = 1}. So the total cost C(X) (assuming that holding cost is zero) of production plan X with demand vector d equals
For further convenience a plan X with X t = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T is called an empty plan and we define p t (X) = ∞ for every empty plan X.
Theorem 1 ELS games are balanced.
Proof By Proposition 1 we may consider an ELS game (N, c) arising
Let B be a balanced collection of 2 N and let λ S ∈ Q + , S ∈ B, be the corresponding weights. It is sufficient to prove that
Note that (4) follows immediately for B = {N }. Now let B = {N } and let q B ∈ N be the smallest integer for which q B λ S is integral for all S ∈ B. Then (4) can be equivalently expressed as
In the summation at the left hand side of (5) we have q B λ S times the cost of the optimal production plan corresponding to each coalition S ∈ B. So in total we have the cost of n B = S∈B q B λ S production plans. For notational convenience let N B = {1, . . . , n B } be the index set of coalitions (in arbitrary order) and let S(i) be the coalition corresponding to index i. So we have q B λ S indices for each coalition S ∈ B. Furthermore, let X i be the optimal production plan corresponding to
The right hand side of (5) It suffices to prove
because then we have
where the last inequality follows from the optimality of 
It is now sufficient to show that the cumulative production costs of plans Y j (j = 1, . . . , q B ) equal at most the cumulative production costs of plans X i (i = 1, . . . , n B ). 
. Now let A be an arbitrary subset of N B with |A| = q B . That is, we choose q B arbitrary coalitions out of N B with corresponding production plans X i (i ∈ A). Let {p t (X i )} i∈A be the set of corresponding production costs. We may assume without loss of generality that A = {1, . . . , q B } and that
Otherwise {p t (Y j )} j=1,...,q B is not the set with the q B smallest production costs. But this implies
for every A ⊂ N B with |A| = q B .
Now consider some player m ∈ N and some period t. We will compare the production cost of player m in period t in production plans X i (i = 1, . . . , n B ) and plans Y j (j = 1, . . . , q B ).
Let I m ⊂ N B be the index set of coalitions in which player m is contained. Note that we must have |I m | = q B . Let {p t (X i )} i∈I m be the set of corresponding production costs. Then the total production costs for player m in plans
Furthermore, the total production costs for player m in plans
But by (8) we have
So the production costs for each player m in each period t are smaller in plans Y j than in plans X i .
To complete the proof note that
and by combining (9) and (10) we have
But then we have
where the inequality follows from (7) and (11). Hence we have proved (6) and hence the theorem.
The following example shows how the procedure of constructing new plans out of existing plans works.
Example 4 Consider a 3-player ELS game with 9 periods. Let B = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} with 
) 1 (10) 0 (10) 0 (10) 1 (7) 0 (7) 0 (7) 1 (5) 0 (5) 1 (1)
) 1 (10) 0 (10) 1 (9) 1 (7) 0 (7) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (1) Table 5 : Illustration of the procedure described in the balancedness proof and 7 both once. Furthermore, note that for every period t and for every A ⊂ N B with |A| = 2, we have that production costs for plans Y j (j = 1, 2) are pairwise smaller than for plans X i (i ∈ A) after ordering them. For example, for t = 7 and A = {2, 3} = I 3 we have
and
The proof and the example show that we can not only save setup costs by cooperation, but we can also save production costs. Furthermore, because the holding costs are incorporated in the (transformed) production costs (see equation (3)), this means that by cooperation also holding cost can be reduced.
Using theorem 1 and the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) ) the following corollary holds:
Corollary 2 ELS games have a non-empty core.
Recall that the core of a cost game (N, c) is defined as the set
In the previous section it was shown that ELS games are balanced. In this section we will give two classes of ELS games for which we can prove a stronger result. In particular, we will show that games within those two classes are concave. A cost game (N, c) is concave if
Concave games have the following nice property. As already mentioned a game is concave if and only if its core is the convex hull of all marginal vectors (see Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) 
for every k ∈ N . The following example shows that ELS games are not concave in general.
Example 5 Consider the 3-player 6-period ELS game according to vector z corresponding to the order σ = (1, 2, 3) equals 644, 385, 364) .
But then for coalition {1, 3} it holds that
Clearly m σ (c) is not a core element, because coalition {1, 3} prefers to leave the grand coalition obtaining a cost of 1004 instead of 1008.
In this section we will give two classes of ELS games that are concave. In the proofs of the concavity theorems again we assume that holding costs are zero.
Proof By Proposition 1 it is sufficient to consider an ELS game (N, c) arising from a zero ELS situation. First, we will proof a property of the function C(δd) with δ > 0, that is, C(δd) is the optimal cost for some positive multiple of the demand vector d. Let P be a production plan represented by its production periods (in increasing order) and let P (T ) be the set of all possible production plans. Furthermore, let s(t) be the first production period after period t in plan P and if period t has no successor, then let s(t) = T + 1. Then the cost C P (δd) of production plan P ∈ P (T ) and demand δd equals
So for a fixed production plan C P (δd) is a linear function of δ. Furthermore, because Besides the ELS game with equal demands for all players, every 2-period ELS game is also concave. For a 2-period ELS problem with demand d we have two possible production plans:
• Production plan (1, 0):
Produce all demand (d 1 + d 2 ) in period 1 incurring costs
• Production plan (1, 1):
Produce d 1 in period 1 and produce d 2 in period 2 incurring costs
It is easy to verify from (13) and (14) that we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Proof By Proposition 1 it is sufficient to consider an ELS game (N, c) arising from a zero ELS situation. We will show that (12) holds. Because ELS games are subadditive, (12) holds for S = Ø.
Let S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i} with S = Ø. We will consider the cases p 1 ≤ p 2 and p 1 > p 2 .
• p 1 ≤ p 2 :
It immediately follows from Proposition 3 that plan (1, 0) is preferred over plan For this case the possible combinations of production plans can be found in table 8. Note that if the optimal plan for e.g. coalition S is (1, 1), then it follows from Proposition 3 that the optimal plan of coalition S ∪{i} also must be (1, 1), because p 1 > p 2 . The same argument applies to T and T ∪ {i} too. Case 2: It follows from Proposition 3 that 
So we have c(S ∪ {i}) − c(S)
= p 1 (d i 1 + d i 2 ) = p 1 d i 1 + p 1 (d T 2 + d i 2 ) − p 1 d T 2 ≥ p 1 d i 1 + K 2 + p 2 (d T 2 + d i 2 ) − p 1 d+ K 2 + p 2 (d S 2 + d i 2 ) − p 1 d S 2 ≥ p 1 d i 1 + K 2 + p 2 (d T 2 + d i 2 ) − p 1 d T 2 = c(T ∪ {i}) − c(T ).
